I cannot resist, before concluding this book, making a few more applications of my three principles.
FIRST QUESTION. There is a question whether the laws should force a citizen to accept public functions. I say they should in a republican, and not in a monarchical, government. In the former, magistracies are testimony to virtue, trusts which the country delegates to a citizen, who should live, act and think only for the republic ; hence he cannot refuse them.  In the latter, magistracies are testimony to honor ; but such is the oddity of honor that can choose to accept none except when it wishes, and in the manner it wishes.
The late king of Sardinia  would punished those who refused the dignities and functions of his state ; he was, unbeknownst to him, following republican ideas. His manner of governing, moreover, sufficiently proves that that was not his intention.
In despotic governments, where honor, positions, and ranks are equally abused, it is indifferent to make of a prince a churl, or of a churl a prince.
In the republic you take up arms only as defender of the laws and the homeland ; it is because you are a citizen that you become a soldier for a time. If there were two distinct estates, you would make the man who thinks of himself as a citizen under arms aware that he is merely a soldier.
In monarchies, men of war have no objective besides glory, or at least honor or fortune. Care must be taken not to give civilian functions to such men ; they must on the contrary be contained by the civilian magistrates, and the same men must not have at the same time the confidence of the people and the force with which to abuse it. 
Observe, in a nation where the republic hides under the form of monarchy, how much they fear a particular estate of men of war, and how the warrior remains still a citizen, or even a magistrate, so these functions will be a token for the country, and that one never forget it.
That division of magistracies made by the Romans into civilian and military after the loss of the republic was not something arbitrary. It was a consequence of the change in the constitution of Rome ; it was in the nature of the monarchical government ; and what was begun under Augustus  to temper the military government, the emperors following  were required to complete.
Thus Procopius, a rival of Valens for the empire, was oblivious to this when, giving to Hormisdas, prince of the royal blood of Persia, the dignity of proconsul,  he turned over to that magistracy the command of the armies it used to have, unless he had reasons of his own. A man who aspires to sovereignty is looking less for what is useful to the state than what is useful to his cause.
This venality is good in monarchical states because it causes something which a person would not wish to undertake for virtue to be exercised as a family profession ; because it destines each person for his duty, and makes the orders of the state more permanent. Suidas  states quite rightly that Anastasios, by selling all the magistracies, had made the empire into a sort of aristocracy.
Plato  cannot abide this venality. It is, he says, “as if on a ship you made someone a pilot or a sailor for his money. Could that rule possibly be bad for every other position in life, and good only for running a republic ?” But Plato is speaking of a republic founded on virtue, and we are speaking of a monarchy. Now, in a monarchy where if the positions are not sold by public requirement, the indigence and avidity of courtiers would sell them all the same, chance will yield better subjects than the prince’s choice. In short, the manner of promoting oneself by wealth inspires and supports industry,  something which this kind of government greatly needs.
We are surprised at the punishment of that Areopagite who had killed a sparrow which, pursued by a hawk, had taken refuge in his bosom. We are surprised that the Areopage sent to his death a child who had put out his bird’s eyes. We must note that the issue here is not the condemnation for crimes, but a moral judgment in a republic based on morality.
In monarchies there must be no censors : monarchies are founded on honor, and the nature of honor is to have the whole world as censor. Every man who fails in that is subject to the reproaches of those very persons who have none.
There, censors would be spoiled by the very persons whom they should correct ; they would not be effective against the corruption of a monarchy, but the corruption of a monarchy would be too strong against them.
It goes without saying that there is no need for censors in despotic governments. The example of China seems an exception to this rule, but we shall see later in this work the singular reasons for that institution.