IV.7 In what case these singular institutions can be good

These sorts of ins­ti­tu­tions can be appo­site in repu­blics, because vir­tue is their prin­ci­ple ; but to moti­vate peo­ple to honor in monar­chies, or to ins­pire fear in des­po­tic sta­tes, does not require so much effort.

They have their place, moreo­ver, only in a small state,1 where a uni­ver­sal edu­ca­tion can be pro­vi­ded, and an entire peo­ple rai­sed like a family.

The laws of Minos, Lycurgus, and Plato assume that all citi­zens will pay close atten­tion to each other. That can­not be pro­mi­sed in the tur­bu­lence, the negli­gence, and the exten­sive busi­ness of a great peo­ple.

Money, as we have said, must be ban­ned in these ins­ti­tu­tions. But in large socie­ties, the num­ber, variety, confu­sion, and impor­tance of busi­ness, the ease of pur­cha­ses, and the slow­ness of exchan­ges, require a com­mon mea­sure. One can­not extend one’s autho­rity eve­ryw­here, or defend it eve­ryw­here, without what men eve­ryw­here have asso­cia­ted with autho­rity.

As were the cities of Greece.