Montesquieu
 

III.6 How virtue is compensated for under monarchical government

I am moving qui­ckly and taking long stri­des so it will not be thought I am sati­ri­zing monar­chi­cal govern­ment. No : if it lacks one resource, it has ano­ther. Honor, which is to say the pre­ju­dice of each per­son and of every rank, takes the place of vir­tue, and repre­sents it eve­ryw­here ; honor can ins­pire the finest deeds ; it can, com­bi­ned with the force of the laws, lead to the govern­ment’s ends like vir­tue itself.

Thus, in well-orde­red monar­chies, eve­ryone will be more or less a good citi­zen, and rarely will anyone be found who is a man of good will ; for being a man of good will requi­res that that be his inten­tion.1

See the first note in III.5.