IV.7 In what case these singular institutions can be good
These sorts of institutions can be apposite in republics, because virtue is their principle ; but to motivate people to honor in monarchies, or to inspire fear in despotic states, does not require so much effort.
They have their place, moreover, only in a small state, [1] where a universal education can be provided, and an entire people raised like a family.
The laws of Minos, Lycurgus, and Plato assume that all citizens will pay close attention to each other. That cannot be promised in the turbulence, the negligence, and the extensive business of a great people.
Money, as we have said, must be banned in these institutions. But in large societies, the number, variety, confusion, and importance of business, the ease of purchases, and the slowness of exchanges, require a common measure. One cannot extend one’s authority everywhere, or defend it everywhere, without what men everywhere have associated with authority.